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New Strategies for an Old Medium:
The Weekly Radio Addresses of Reagan and Clinton
“Of the untold values of the radio, one is the great intimacy it has brought among our people.
Through its mysterious channels we come to wider acquaintance with surroundings and men.”
President Herbert Hoover,
Radio Address to the Nation,
September 18, 1929
While president, Bill Clinton was never one to miss a public speaking opportunity. True
to his word that he would “work until the last hour of the last day” in office, Clinton’s last of 416
weekly radio broadcasts aired the morning of January 20, 2001, just hours before George W.
Bush took the oath of office. Referring to his weekly radio addresses as his “Saturday
conversations” with the American public, Clinton stated: “For eight years, we’ve done
everything in our power to reach beyond party and beyond Washington to put the American
people first, overcoming obstacles, seizing opportunities. That’s what these radio addresses have
been all about. These Saturday talks have often marked action taken to make our schools
stronger, our environment cleaner, our food safer, our health care more secure.” Clinton’s
assessment of the radio addresses was mostly true; he did speak on a variety of policy issues,
mostly domestic ones, throughout his eight years in office. However, his use of weekly radio
addresses, like that of Ronald Reagan, provided a unique opportunity to not only “talk” with
Americans in a five-minute radio broadcast about important policy matters, but also served as a
ready-made news-making opportunity in a controlled format that White House reporters found
difficult to distort.
Attempts at control of the White House message and the overall political agenda have
long been goals of American presidents. During the twentieth century, the president emerged as
a dominant rhetorical figure in American politics with many public opportunities to influence the
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national agenda. A president’s public activities, as well as media strategies to get his message
out, are important in understanding the parameters of presidential leadership and policy
outcomes during the television age. However, in a time when image and the use of television
have been important for political leaders and candidates alike, two of the best-known
communicators to occupy the White House during the television age—Reagan and Clinton—
relied on weekly radio addresses as part of their overall communication strategy. Perhaps no
president during the twentieth century made better use of radio addresses than did Franklin D.
Roosevelt with his “fireside chats,” which he viewed as an opportunity to educate the American
public through simple and frank discussions about major concerns of the day (Gelderman 1997,
11). In that same tradition, both Reagan and Clinton relied on weekly radio addresses to
supplement their public agenda, target specific policies, most often domestic or economic, and
reach citizens who may not be watching television. Perhaps more importantly, this also provided
additional coverage in the news media of a controlled event, since the presidents’ weekly radio
addresses routinely made the weekend television news shows, especially on CNN, as well as the
national Sunday newspapers.
While a rich literature exists on presidential communications (including the
public/rhetorical presidency and the presidential/press relationship), only recently have
presidential scholars begun to analyze weekly radio addresses as an important primary unit of
analysis (Rowland and Jones 2002; Sigelman and Whissell 2002a, 2002b). This article analyzes
how the use of radio has fit into the overall development of White House communication
strategies during the television age, and takes an in-depth look at how Reagan and Clinton used
weekly radio addresses to communicate with both the American public and the news media.
Specifically, the issues considered here include the strategy development among White House
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communication advisors (why did the Reagan and Clinton administrations believe this was an
important means of communication?), the policies emphasized in the weekly radio addresses
(what did the president talk about?), and the frequency of news coverage concerning the weekly
radio addresses (does consistent news coverage occur during the 24-hour news cycle following
the address, and if so, in which media sources?).

Presidents and Radio – A Brief History
Presidential attempts to communicate via radio date back to James Buchanan’s
administration in 1858, when the first attempt by the President to exchange messages with Queen
Victoria occurred on August 16 by telegraph wires laid across the Atlantic. The entire exchange
(from the Queen to the President and back again) took three days. By January 1903, the quality
of the exchange of messages between the United States and England had improved dramatically
as King Edward III and Theodore Roosevelt exchanged greetings by wireless telegraph (Archer
1971, 39, 75). Perhaps a more dramatic purpose, Woodrow Wilson relied on the Naval
Communications Board to flash wireless messages around the globe during World War I (Archer
1971, 141). One of the first known public radio broadcasts came in 1916 with a post-election
report on Wilson’s reelection campaign delivered from an experimental station in New York.
However, the beginning of commercial radio began with the broadcast of the 1920 presidential
election results by KDKA in Pittsburgh. This report of Warren G. Harding’s election is the
political event “that first brought radio’s potential to the attention of politicians” (Minow,
Martin, and Mitchell 1973, 26).
Considered by most media scholars as the first “radio president,” due mostly to the
availability of the new technology during the 1920s, Harding’s inauguration was the first to be
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broadcast by radio. The medium was still in its early stages, yet Harding’s was the first
presidential voice heard by most Americans. He delivered a series of messages to the American
public by radio during the summer of 1923, including an address in St. Louis on June 21, which
was carried by special wire to New York City and broadcast over station WEAF. Harding had
planned to deliver a national radio address from San Francisco on July 31 to be broadcast in San
Francisco, Chicago, New York, Omaha, Washington, and Round Hills, Mass. However, he fell
ill and died on August 2 (Archer 1971, 317-318).
Later that year, Calvin Coolidge, who succeeded Harding, delivered his first message to
the Congress as president on December 4, and this address was broadcast to a national audience.
Mostly unknown to the nation during his tenure as Harding’s vice president, Coolidge effectively
used radio to introduce himself to a national audience, and radio continued to play an important
part in Coolidge’s political career. His performance on radio broadcasts to the American public
was considered successful, and this discouraged any serious challenge for the Republican Party’s
presidential nomination in 1924 (Archer 1971, 323-324). Twenty-one radio stations broadcast
Coolidge’s inauguration on March 4, 1925, with an estimated 15 million people listening to the
president’s voice. At the time, this fact “staggered the imagination of thoughtful observers. Our
far-flung democracy had at last found a means by which its duly elected Chief Executive could
discuss great problems of the nation directly with all the people” (Archer 1971, 354).
Elected in 1928, Herbert Hoover also had a long-term relationship with radio. He served
as Secretary of Commerce during the Harding and Coolidge administrations from 1921 through
1928, and one of his main duties was to develop and regulate the use of radio. Hoover
recognized the use of radio by government officials as an interesting dilemma; radio could be
both a “powerful educational force” and a tool for political propaganda as well. In his memoirs,
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written in 1952, Hoover wrote, “There is little adequate answer to a lying microphone . . .
propaganda is seldom the whole truth [and] the officials currently in office have preponderant
time at the microphone, and theirs becomes the dominant voice” (Hoover 1952, 146-147).
During his four years in the White House, Hoover delivered a total of twenty-three “Radio
Addresses to the Nation” on foreign, domestic, and economic policy issues, as well as
ceremonial events. 1
As a means to establish “direct contact with the people,” Roosevelt delivered the first of
his thirty fireside chats at the end of his first week in the Oval Office in March 1933. 2
Considered a brilliant success, the speech allowed Roosevelt to reassure the American public that
he would guide the Depression economy into recovery. He began the first radio address by
saying “I want to talk for a few minutes with the people of the United States about banking,” and
continued for twenty minutes explaining in layman’s terms what Americans could do to assist in
the recovery. This began an effective trend that the President would rely on throughout his
tenure in office—the use of radio to enter the living rooms of Americans to talk, in simple terms
that were easily understood, about the problems and challenges facing the country (Burns 1956,
167-168). While Roosevelt was also successful in his mastery of the press, skillfully managing
news out of the White House through his frequent press conferences in the Oval Office, radio
was his “most important link with the people.” Roosevelt’s warm voice and public speaking
skills provided a natural format for the President, and he enjoyed these opportunities to chat with
Americans. According to presidential scholar James MacGregor Burns (1956, 204-205),
Roosevelt connected with the American public through radio:
Read in cold newspaper print the next day, these talks seemed somewhat stilted and
banal. Heard in the parlor, they were fresh, intimate, direct, moving. The radio chats
were effective largely because Roosevelt threw himself into the role of a father talking
with his great family. He made a conscious effort to visualize the people he was talking

5

to. He forgot the microphone . . . [a]nd his listeners would nod and smile and laugh with
him.
From Roosevelt’s tenure to the end of the 1960s, television slowly emerged as the
preferred medium for presidents to speak to the American public. With television still in its
infancy during the mid-1940s, Harry Truman relied on radio broadcasts to talk to the nation
about important domestic policy issues such as price controls and welfare programs, as well as
international policies such as the Marshall plan. His address receiving the highest percentage of
listeners came when he announced the V-E Day surrender in 1945. But Truman was not the
master of the airwaves as his predecessor had been; he was “under no illusion that he was equal
of Franklin Roosevelt as a radio speaker,” and many acknowledged that “he suffered prestigewise from the fact that he followed Roosevelt as President” (Chester 1969, 50-51). Dwight
Eisenhower had used radio addresses during WWII with a well-known radio broadcast following
the invasion of Normandy, and throughout the late 1940s to urge support for the Marshall Plan.
In 1953, White House advisors, led by Press Secretary James Hagerty, developed an extensive
public relations campaign to promote the achievements of the administration while downplaying
McCarthyism. This strategy included televised addresses to be broadcast simultaneously on
radio networks, television versions of the “fireside chats” made famous by Roosevelt, and radio
broadcasts of news conferences. The latter was an attempt to formalize Eisenhower’s
relationship with the news media and to guarantee that responses in his news conferences could
not be distorted or taken out of context (Allen 1993, 23-27, 54-55).
John F. Kennedy, known for his innovative use of television to build the image of his
administration and family, as well as his successor Lyndon Johnson, did not utilize regular radio
broadcasts as part of their overall communication strategies. However, Kennedy and Johnson
aired simultaneous radio broadcasts of their televised press conferences and major addresses on
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the major radio networks. The use of radio by itself—without television—seemed to reemerge
during the Nixon administration. Nixon had been a successful debater in his younger days and
performed better on a medium that did not rely as heavily on image—“his face [was] missing,
his voice [was] as effective as ever.” Nixon also performed better without the intense pressure
that came with a television appearance, and radio did not risk overexposure (Martin, Minow and
Mitchell 1973, 46).
The use of radio was a frequent topic among Nixon advisors who as early as 1969 urged
the President to give a series of radio addresses on specific policy topics. Many within the White
House considered the strategy sound, but the actual events continued to be postponed.
Eventually Nixon gave four radio addresses during his first term, as well as a series of paid radio
addresses on key policies during the fall of 1972 as part of his reelection campaign. 3 A series of
radio addresses finally materialized during 1973 and 1974, and six such addresses substituted for
a State of the Union Address to the nation in 1973. Between January and March 1973, Nixon
gave radio addresses on six aspects of the State of the Union message that he submitted to
Congress, including the federal budget, the environment, the economy, human resources,
community development, and law enforcement and preventing drug abuse. Advisors believed
that radio speeches would receive coverage on the substance of the issue and would direct
particular messages to specific audiences. Several radio addresses on economic or agricultural
issues were broadcast during the day to target housewives, unemployed, or farm workers “not
confined to regular office hours” (Martin, Minow and Mitchell 1973, 58-59). By early 1973,
with the Watergate investigation consuming more public attention and preoccupying the White
House, radio addresses allowed Nixon to communicate with the public on domestic policy issues
while avoiding public appearances.
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Both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter gave few radio addresses during their presidential
campaigns in 1976 and 1980, respectively, but neither wanted to focus their communication
efforts on radio as had occurred during the Nixon administration. However, with the creation of
the White House Office of Communication in 1969, an extensive radio actuality service (known
as audio press releases) was put into place, and all presidential advisors since Nixon, including
those in the Ford and Carter administrations, have used this service extensively to promote the
president and his views to radio listeners across the nation. Following Reagan’s weekly radio
addresses that began in 1982, George H. W. Bush gave only five radio addresses in 1991, and
thirteen in 1992 (all but three delivered on a Saturday morning). Twelve of the radio addresses
focused on domestic or economic policy, while only one dealt with foreign policy (Address to
the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 1/5/91). The remaining five addressed topics such as
national holidays, the Points of Light volunteer program, and the results of the 1992 presidential
election.

Research Design
An extensive literature has emerged in recent years on the rhetorical presidency, as well
as the public aspects of the office of the presidency, recent changes in White House
communication strategies, and patterns of news media coverage of the White House (Kernell
1997; Tulis 1987; Hart 1987; Stuckey 1991; Maltese 1994; Han 2001; Grossman and Kumar
1981). This research will build on that literature in an attempt to not only discover the policy
focus present in radio addresses, but also the context of the resulting media coverage of the
president’s use of radio. This article explores the strategy behind the use of weekly radio
addresses by both Reagan and Clinton as part of their overall communication strategy and
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determines the policy prioritization in the weekly radio addresses. Also, subsequent news
coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post (available on LexisNexis) and on the
nightly network newscasts of ABC, CBS, and NBC (available on the Vanderbilt Television
Archives) was content analyzed to determine the extent of coverage on the radio addresses. The
rationale for the study comes from the ongoing attempts of presidents and their communication
advisors to control as much of their message as possible, the belief that the radio address
provides an effective, unfiltered format from which the president can speak, and the sense that
coverage of the weekly radio address has become a standard feature of weekend news among the
elite news outlets that drive the national news agenda. (Rowland and Jones 2002; Martin 1984).
Several research questions are addressed. First, how did communication advisors in each
administration prepare and strategize the use of weekly radio addresses from the standpoint of
policy emphasis and news coverage? Considered successful television communicators, Reagan
and Clinton provide an interesting case study on how radio addresses fit with their
administration’s communication strategies. For insight on the Reagan administration’s strategy,
research was conducted at the Reagan Presidential Library, and open White House files of key
advisors (including David Gergen, Michael Deaver, Larry Speakes, James Baker, Pat Buchanan,
and Marlin Fitzwater) and open White House Speechwriting Research files were examined to
locate information on weekly radio addresses. For insight into Clinton, an interview was
conducted with Megan Moloney, the Director of Radio and Television Production in the Office
of the Press Secretary from 1997 through 2000.
Second, what policies did each president emphasize in weekly radio addresses? Each
reference to a particular policy within a speech was counted to measure the frequency with
which each president discussed issues on their respective agendas (Han 2001, 16). A total of
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twelve policy categories were developed for coding. 4 When using content analysis,
measurement is defined as “counting the occurrences of meaning units such as specific words,
phrases, content categories, and themes” (Weber 1990, 70). Following the coding of policy
references in all addresses, to determine the policy prioritization for each president policy topics
for the speeches were rank ordered by how often each was mentioned.
Third, how consistent is news coverage of weekly radio addresses in the news media?
While the message as presented in weekly radio addresses can say a lot about a president’s
agenda, few people actually hear those addresses. Determining who actually listens to the
weekly radio address has been difficult to track; even White House advisors have been unsure of
the exact audience and the number of weekly listeners (Carney 2003). Therefore, how the
president’s message is portrayed in the news media is critical in order to understand how the
public perceives the message, since it has been well known since 1982 that the more important
goal of the radio address from the White House perspective is to help set the president’s policy
agenda and receive weekend coverage (Networks Uncertain 1993; Viles 1993; Puig 1993).

Ronald Reagan’s Weekly Radio Addresses
Strategy: Communication advisors to Reagan believed that radio provided an additional
medium that allowed him to talk directly to the American people about his policy agenda without
any distortion by the national news media. Reagan, who greatly admired FDR, began his
entertainment career as a radio broadcaster during the 1930s. During the television age,
presidents had only sporadically used radio addresses to present their policy agendas to the
American public, but in April 1982, Reagan began his weekly radio addresses to the nation. The
five-minute broadcasts each Saturday would generally reiterate policy issues that had been
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earlier discussed in other public venues by both the President and his advisors. Like during his
television appearances, Reagan would provide a simplified and straightforward version of
Washington politics to his listeners, often appealing to his fellow Americans to aid him in his
fight against the evils of the political world (like the corruption of big government in Washington
or the spread of global communism), and he always presented his position on policies as the
reasonable alternative to which the average American could relate (Han 2001, 181).
Along with speeches from the Oval Office, Reagan used his weekly radio addresses as
his “principal means to converse with the American people.” His down-to-earth speaking style
came through over the radio just as it did through television, and gave him the opportunity to
share his vision and goals for America. Reagan’s public speeches always focused more on the
broader vision for America’s future, not specific policies, and the five-minute radio format was
the perfect opportunity for him to share his views with citizens while not overwhelming them
with facts and figures. Reagan was always able to master the medium that he was using, which
certainly aided the job of his communication advisors. Radio was also one of the only means of
communication for the president during the Iran-Contra scandal—he took a four-month absence
from most public appearances, and while not answering questions about the scandal, his weekly
radio addresses still provided policy continuity. As communications advisor Tom Griscom
states, “It is important for each president to know their communication strengths and how to
incorporate them into their administration . . . Reagan understood his strengths and how to make
those strengths available for public consumption” (Griscom 1997, 64-66).
In addition, one of the greatest successes of the Reagan administration was its ability to
control the political agenda, as well as setting the terms of public debate, and the radio addresses
became part of that overall strategy. The administration adopted basic news management
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principles, including the use of a consistent theme and delivering the line-of-the-day to the press,
which developed each morning and was passed throughout the administration. Reagan's aides
had realized that their greatest asset was the President himself, and began using two basic tactics
to get his message to the American people: public appearances would be carefully staged and
controlled to emphasize Reagan’s personality, and he would be promoted as a can-do leader
rather than placing any emphasis on a political philosophy (Hertsgaard 1988, 33-37, 105-106.)
According to Washington Post journalist David Broder (1987, 176-199), the policies and
priorities of the communication staff included limiting direct access to the President, making
news management a major priority for trusted White House aides and cabinet secretaries, and
shutting down the flow of information from lower levels of the administration. As a result, the
Reagan administration has been acknowledged for its "stunningly successful news management."
In 1986, Reagan (1986) wrote an article that appeared in Broadcasting in which he
discussed his love of radio as a medium and his goal in delivering weekly radio addresses:
Some journalists have suggested recently that the radio address should make news every
week. More often than not the address does make headlines, but that was never my
intent. I initiated the White House radio series on April 3, 1982, because I believed there
was so much conflict and confusion coming out of Washington it was hard for people to
know what was really happening.
However, his advisors were more intent on making the radio addresses as newsworthy as
possible and maximizing positive coverage for the President. For example, in preparing for
Reagan’s first radio address on the administration’s economic recovery plan (delivered on April
3, 1982), communications director David Gergen, who played an integral role in the radio
addresses during his three year tenure between January 1981 and January 1984, was concerned
that the talk would not “have anything new to say . . . My bet is that the unemployment number
tomorrow will be over 9%. If we have a line saying that it won’t go much higher, or something
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to that effect, that would also make the speech more newsworthy” (Gergen 1982a). The
following month, the May 1st radio address was to serve as a follow up to Reagan’s April 29th
address to the nation on the federal budget and his urging of Congress to support a constitutional
amendment for a balanced budget. After reading the draft of the speech, Gergen wrote in the
margins that he “thought this speech was going to have more on const’l amendment—that’s
supposed to be the heart of it & headline (sic)” (Gergen 1982b).
In 1983, during the second year of the weekly radio addresses, newsworthiness was still a
major concern. In preparing the March 2, 1983 radio talk on unemployment, Gergen (1983a)
critiqued the draft as having
some good material here, and while it’s dry, I think the distinction between cyclical and
structural unemployment is worth making. My concern about the speech is that it isn’t
newsy enough to get much attention. It also needs a little more topicality—after all, the
leading indicators today made their biggest single jump in 33 years and unemployment
numbers will have come out just the day before he speaks.
However, not all topics deemed newsworthy were incorporated into radio addresses. In October
1985, communications director Patrick Buchanan (1985), who had replaced Gergen in January
1985 after the position had remained vacant for nearly a year during the 1984 campaign, urged
other top officials to have Reagan discuss the AIDS epidemic.
With the number of AIDS cases moving toward the 14,000 mark, and the number of dead
at or near 7,000, with the story making the press every day, and becoming the medical
story of the decade, if not the century—ought we not consider putting the President down
on record in a radio speech on the subject. I could guarantee an interested reception from
the national press.
Despite Buchanan’s suggestions, Reagan never delivered an address on this topic.
Along with making the news, other strategic issues were considered by advisors when
preparing the weekly radio addresses. For Reagan’s May 14, 1983 talk on small businesses,
Gergen (1983b) complained about the lack of personalization in the draft:
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Speech is ok, but I think we miss a good bet when we don’t personalize speeches like
this. Just this week, RR presented awards to the top small business leaders across the
country—and they represented the best in the U.S. Winners were a Hispanic family, and
among the others were many minority leaders and women. Why not play up people like
the Ruiz family—would help in all sorts of way. RR has been excellent in his radio
speeches in past by personalizing. Can we do that here, or is it beyond us?
Radio addresses also served an important purpose in maintaining control over the news agenda,
reiterating other policies discussed by Reagan in other venues, and keeping Reagan one step
ahead of Congress in promoting his particular views. William P. Clark (1983), assistant for
National Security Affairs, urged communication advisors to have the July 16, 1983 speech target
the issue of arms control and reduction (which it did):
You are well aware of the fact that support on the Hill for the M-X is slipping. In order
to reverse this dangerous trend, it is vital that the President remain out in front on this
issue and continue to exhibit ‘flexibility’ and enthusiasm for arms control. I, therefore,
strongly recommend to you that the President’s July 16 radio address deal exclusively
with arms control.
Radio addresses were also an excellent opportunity to promote White House initiatives
under one common theme, as evidenced by Reagan’s address on education and drug abuse on
September 6, 1986. This address included discussions on a recent National Governors
Association report on education, a new White House report on the nation’s elementary schools,
and a Department of Education report to the First Lady about schools without drugs. As one
memo suggested, “As schools are opening, it would be a good time for the President to speak to
students and parents about some of the education themes with which he’s come to be identified:
standards, discipline, values, parental involvement. Furthermore, there are several new
developments which might serve as useful ‘pegs’ for his discussion” (Kristol 1986). Toward the
end of Reagan’s second term, his advisors became concerned about the content of his radio
addresses as he began to receive criticism from the national press for not presenting new
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information in his public remarks. In preparation for the Feb. 7, 1987 radio address on welfare,
one memo noted
Pages 2 and 3 are taken almost verbatim from a radio speech on welfare the President did
about one year ago. Given some of the criticism of the State of the Union Address as
stale and reporters’ enterprise in tracking down text in that speech that had been used
before, we would suggest that some of the material on these pages be dropped or revised.
As drafted, the speech puts the Administration’s welfare reform initiatives in a context
that could generate criticism about the ‘same old stuff from the Administration’ in an area
where we are trying to undertake thoughtful, new reforms (Tupper 1987).
When the weekly radio addresses first began in 1982, many journalists wanted to know
the exact audience for the President’s messages. Network officials have never been able to
provide a true estimate, although Mutual Broadcasting claimed in 1982 that 245 of their 940
affiliates carried the address, with an estimated audience of 1.5 million. Reagan’s deputy press
secretary, Larry Speakes, estimated that 1,000 stations were carrying the remarks in 1982, but
that figure was never substantiated. ABC, NBC, Associated Press and United Press International
also carried the radio addresses each week, with CBS as the only holdout among major networks
(Networks Uncertain 1982). While considered successful for Reagan, the radio broadcasts were
not without their problems or controversy. When they began, equal time issues arose, which
later required radio networks to allow equal time for a Democratic response. In 1983, the AP
and UPI announced that they would no longer carry the speech live each week due to Reagan’s
status as a presidential candidate, covering both the President’s remarks and the Democratic
response as news events on a delayed basis. A flap also occurred in 1986 between the White
House and Ron Nessen, vice president of news for Mutual Broadcasting and former press
secretary to President Gerald Ford, when Nessen ignored an embargo on a Reagan radio address
that had been taped in advance. Six weeks earlier, Nessen had decided to drop the live broadcast
of the weekly speeches due to lack of newsworthiness, calling the speeches a “rehash of his
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previously enunciated views on various topics.” According to Nessen, the embargoed speech
contained “real news” and necessitated its airing a day before scheduled. Nessen was harshly
criticized by White House officials, including Speakes, who threatened “punitive action” against
Mutual. Nevertheless, Nessen defended his actions by stating that “he had been troubled by the
arrangement of airing the weekly presidential and Democratic statements for some time because
it surrendered to the politicians what is the basic responsibility of the media—deciding what is
and what is not news” (Mutual Clashes 1986).
In 1985, advisors developed a strategy to take one of the radio addresses global in an
attempt to maximize news coverage and better manage the news. Reagan’s radio address on
Nov. 9, 1985, in which he discussed the upcoming summit in Geneva with Soviet leader Mikhael
Gorbachev, was delivered from the Voice of America headquarters in Washington, D.C. instead
of the usual Oval Office location. The broadcast was heard throughout the world in seven
languages, including Russian, in at least seventy-five countries “as a prelude to the upcoming
meetings in Geneva” (Hooley 1985). The address was also televised by satellite transmission via
Worldnet to Western and Eastern Europe from the VOA headquarters, with two goals:
“guaranteeing maximum foreign utilization of this speech . . . [and] increased audience and
network attention in the U.S.” Separate from the usual network feed, the United States
Information Agency provided a second radio pool, to feed the address in forty-two languages to
an estimated 120 million people. White House public relations advisors worked hard to promote
the event to ensure that the American television networks could also prepare for the broadcast
(Board 1985). Advisors were pleased with the resulting coverage. Charles Z. Wick, Director of
the United States Information Agency, called the event “nothing less than a great public
diplomacy success.” According to Wick (1985), the address was audible on two separate
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frequencies in both Moscow and Leningrad, and the event “resulted in excellent TV placement
all over the world” with an estimated 100 million viewers, including foreign editorials that “cast
the President in the mold of the ‘President of Peace.’” Assessed by the White House, American
coverage of the event was a great success as well, including CNN’s live broadcast of the entire
speech, a “healthy segment” on the NBC Nightly News (ABC and CBS news were preempted by
college football), a lead story on ABC’s Nightline with segments of the address, and “lengthy
stories” in the New York Times (including the entire transcript), Washington Post, Los Angeles
Times, Washington Times, Dallas Morning News, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune and
Philadelphia Enquirer (Board 1985).
In their analysis of Reagan’s radio addresses, Rowland and Jones (2002) conclude that
Reagan was “a sophisticated and involved rhetorician who skillfully chose among the available
means of persuasion to appeal to the broadest possible audience.” The study concludes that the
radio addresses support the revisionist view of Reagan as a communicator—that his rhetoric was
more moderate and inclusive than conservative and exclusive, and that he was an involved
participant in the creation of his public remarks and not just a former actor delivering lines. On
foreign policy issues, Reagan may have taken a conservative view in his radio addresses, but he
avoided discussing social domestic issues that appeal to conservatives (like abortion or school
prayer) and took an “inclusive worldview” by directing many of his addresses to minority groups
and women. The radio addresses also offered much substantive information based on “rational
argument in general and statistical proof in particular,” and that Reagan also defended his
approach to reforming, rather than opposing, federal programs (Rowland and Jones 2002). In his
early study on the Reagan radio addresses during the first term, Martin concludes that from a
strategic standpoint, the administration was pleased with the outcome of the weekly events in
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that “the attention his views usually receive in the press and broadcast media, even when
countered by opposition spokespersons, does more good than harm to his Administration’s
goals” (Martin 1984).
Policy Prioritization: In each year, the policy prioritization in Reagan’s radio addresses
focused on either economic or international issues, with much less attention paid to domestic
issues. Beginning in 1982, and later throughout 1988-89, the category of Domestic
Fiscal/Monetary issues outranked all other policy issues in Reagan’s radio addresses during
1982, 1984, 1986, and 1987. During the remaining three years (1983, 1985, and 1988-89), the
Diplomatic/Military category outranked all other policy issues (See Table 1). The policy
prioritization in Reagan’s radio addresses is consistent with that of his major public addresses in
focusing most prominently on economic and international issues. In 1981 and 1982, Domestic
Fiscal/Monetary policies received the top priority in Reagan’s major public addresses, while the
Diplomatic/Military category ranked first during Reagan’s remaining six years in office (Han
2001, 196-198).
News coverage: From the beginning in 1982, members of the Reagan administration
were open about their strategy for using weekly radio addresses, “designed to bypass the press
and go directly to the public, just in time to make the widely circulated Sunday newspapers”
(Herbers 1982). Table 2 shows the frequency of stories in the Sunday edition of the New York
Times and the Washington Post, as well as stories during the Saturday evening broadcasts for
each of the network news programs that focused solely on, or prominently featured, a discussion
of the President’s weekly radio address. Accessed from LexisNexis, news stories in the New
York Times (filed from either the national or foreign desks and appearing in the front section of
the newspaper) and the Washington Post (appearing in the front section of the newspaper)
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included those published in the following Sunday edition. 5 Stories from each of the networks
were accessed on the Vanderbilt Television News Archives. The number of stories appearing in
the Times or the Post does not reflect a weekly average, since some Sunday editions included
more than one story/reference to the radio address, and other Sunday editions included no stories
or references. While the data does not include a categorization of stories by policy topic, the
numbers do imply that both newspapers considered the weekly radio address a regular topic of
interest to Sunday readers. In addition, a number of stories appeared in each paper on other days
of the week either previewing upcoming topics or referencing past topics discussed in the
president’s weekly radio talks. 6 The television networks were a bit slower in covering the radio
address on a regular basis (particularly ABC), but provided coverage to about one-fourth to onethird of the weekly events.
Table 2 – News Coverage: Stories on Reagan’s Weekly Radio Addresses

NY Times
Wash. Post
ABC
CBS
NBC

1982
20
21

1983
41
31

1984
23
16

1985
48
38

1986
43
25

1987
45
27

1988-89
25
16

0
7
9

1
19
13

1
6
2

16
12
20

14
15
13

21
20
21

9
11
11

Bill Clinton’s Weekly Radio Addresses
Strategy: Following the Reagan tradition, Bill Clinton delivered his first weekly radio
address on Saturday, February 6, 1993. While many stations carried the first broadcast live, just
as they had done with Reagan, other stations refused to carry the address at all. Recognizing that
Clinton’s radio addresses, just like Reagan’s, would be “used more as an opportunity to set the
agenda for weekend news coverage than to reach a live audience via radio,” many radio
networks were skeptical about the importance of airing the weekly broadcasts (Viles 1993). For
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example, by October 1993, none of the eighty stations in the Los Angeles-Orange County area,
one of the nation’s largest media markets, were carrying Clinton’s weekly address. White House
advisors insisted that the address was a great opportunity for the President to “reach out and
communicate directly to the American people,” while many station managers insisted that any
newsworthy highlights would be covered later in the news day (Puig 1993).
According to Megan Moloney (interviewed August 1, 2001), Clinton’s Director of Radio
and Television Production in the Office of the Press Secretary from February 1997 to December
2000, approximately 100 stations across the nation carried the weekly radio address. By
Clinton’s second term, thirteen of the top fifteen media markets carried the address (San
Francisco and Atlanta did not). The exact number of stations was difficult to track because the
radio address did not include commercials; therefore, the stations did not report carrying the
address. But those carrying it were a mix of urban and rural, and all of the major radio networks
in the country had stations that carried the address (ABC, CBS, Westwood One/NBC/Mutual,
Associated Press, UPI Radio, Standard, NPR, USA, American Urban Network, and CNN). Also
by the second term, roughly forty percent of the broadcasts were live, while the rest were
recorded usually on Friday afternoon (either in the Oval Office or wherever the President was
traveling). Live broadcasts were originally distributed through the Washington Area Network
Distribution, with production rotated among the various networks, but this was taken over by
ABC in June of 1995. Clinton’s live broadcasts were often late, and several networks had
threatened to stop the production due to scheduling and technical difficulties. The number of
stations carrying the broadcast reached its peak in 1995, but began to decline in 1997.
The use of radio played an important role in the development of a communication
strategy in the Clinton White House (Moloney, 2001). For example, Clinton held a talk radio
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day at the White House in 1994 during his unsuccessful bid to pass major health care legislation,
White House studios were made available to radio stations for broadcasting live from the White
House, and Clinton regularly participated in radio interviews and conference calls. The radio
actuality service was also an important part of the radio strategy, and messages were often statespecific. Beginning in 1997, a voice mail-based system provided information to stations by
geographic region or by presidential events with two or three pieces of sound available each day.
The Press Office also received several letters, e-mails, and phone calls each month from citizens
asking where they could hear the weekly radio address. According to Moloney, “This was a
good indication that people were getting the message about the radio address.” Responses to
these inquiries would include an attempt to match the person with a radio station in their area
that carried the address. The audio was also posted on the White House web page, as well as a
transcript, and C-SPAN would also air the audio on Saturdays. In 1996, a written Spanish
translation was often read on Spanish radio stations.
According to Moloney, the Clinton administration “realized early on the importance of
the history of radio addresses, going back to FDR’s Fireside Chats. This played a very strong
part in the decision to use radio, since it was a way of reaching out to people through a common
medium. The use of radio, especially radio addresses, is important. For example, the President
wanted to reach out to the agricultural community, and this represents a group that is really tied
to their radios. The weekly radio address was a way to reach out directly to these listeners.”
Issues discussed in the radio address often focused on a second tier issue that was not being
covered as heavily that week in the news. The radio address got the information out, Maloney
said, although the main audience was the Sunday newspaper readers and to generate news on the
weekend talk shows. For example, when federal grants were being distributed, newspapers in a
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particular city or state that was the recipient of the grant funding would be contacted in advance
with the news under an embargo. A story would then usually appear in the local Sunday paper
about the program and note that Clinton had announced it during his weekly radio address.
Other topics included standard seasonal stories, like food safety at the start of summer or an
annual message related to the observance of Veteran’s Day. According to Moloney, “Often, the
radio address was an opportunity to address a policy issue for the first time, or to reiterate an
issue of major national importance,” and pre-recorded addresses could also be changed at the last
minute to keep up with developing national or international events.
Clinton occasionally made joint remarks during the radio address, including with his
wife, Tipper Gore (on issues of homelessness and mental health), British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, and Nelson Mandela. Vice President Al Gore filled in twice for Clinton during the second
term, delivering the weekly address once when Clinton had laryngitis, and the other time when
Clinton was hospitalized for a leg injury. The recording and broadcast of the address from the
Oval Office was always a big event, with usually more than 100 people in attendance, including
staff, family, friends, and other individuals related to the topic. Clinton had originally recorded
the address in the Roosevelt Room, but it only held forty people and the address later moved to
the Oval Office. This was also an excellent chance for photo opportunities, with the event
similar to a bill signing in the Rose Garden. Whether live or recorded, Clinton would often go
“off-script” when delivering his remarks, and according to Moloney, he was “amazing at
inserting information and getting all the necessary information in while not following the script.”
Clinton would also “go long” with his radio addresses, and during the second term some stations,
including WTOP in Washington, D.C. threatened to stop carrying the address. Moloney
implemented and imposed the “five minute” rule, insisting that the President finish his remarks
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within the allotted time. As a result, Clinton took great pleasure in getting as close to the fiveminute mark as possible, and would usually ask, “How long was it?” at the conclusion of each
address (Moloney, 2001).
Policy Prioritization: Unlike Reagan, Clinton’s radio addresses focused mostly on
domestic issues, with much less attention paid to international issues. During 1994, 1996, and
1999, Anti-Crime issues outranked all other policy issues. During the remaining years, Domestic
Fiscal/Monetary policies ranked first in 1993 and 1995, Health Care ranked first in 1998 and
2000-01, with Education ranking first in 1997 (See Table 3). The policy topics covered in
Clinton’s radio addresses is consistent with that of his major public addresses in that it was “both
expansive and diverse,” especially in his attention to a wide variety of domestic matters (Han
2001, 237-238).
News Coverage: Table 4 shows the frequency of stories in the Sunday edition of the New
York Times and the Washington Post, as well as stories during the Saturday evening broadcasts
for each of the network news programs, that focused solely on or prominently featured a
discussion of Clinton’s weekly radio address. In general, the number of stories in both papers is
slightly higher than for Reagan, while the number of stories on the television networks are
similar to those during the Reagan years. Also like the Reagan data, several stories appeared in
both newspapers on days other than Sunday that either previewed upcoming or referenced past
radio addresses. 7
Table 4 – News Coverage: Stories on Clinton’s Weekly Radio Addresses

NY Times
Wash. Post
ABC
CBS
NBC

1993
26
15

1994
17
18

1995
38
38

1996
40
37

1997
43
34

1998
30
39

1999
31
37

2000-01
33
45

13
14
10

12
12
9

1
9
5

9
6
5

4
2
9

15
3
11

11
4
4

6
1
2
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Analysis
As Reagan wrote in 1986, “I do my Saturday broadcast live because it permits me to talk
directly to people, and they know it. There is nothing between us—no editors, no reporters, no
third parties of any kind. Live radio is a spontaneous, fresh event.” However, it is safe to
assume that most Americans do not actually hear the weekly message live or later in the day.
Unlike FDR’s Fireside Chats, which served as an important means for the president to
communicate directly with citizens, the use of radio addresses during the television age seem to,
first and foremost, satisfy the need for the White House to control as much of the weekend news
agenda as possible.
Reagan and Clinton showed similarities in their strategic use of radio addresses, as well
as some differences in the overall topic and style of the message. According to Sigelman and
Whissell (2002a), Clinton presented a more active and positive image, while Reagan spoke to the
average American. “To judge from what they said, the two presidents seem to have approached
the broadcasts with more or less the same goals and in more or less the same frame of mind.”
The use of radio by recent presidents serves as yet one more outlet for a policy message
in an era saturated by various entertainment mediums. As Baum and Kernell (1999) point out,
“[P]residents’ diminished access to the national television audience will present a serious
strategic dilemma in the future.” The burgeoning cable industry has “ended the golden age of
television” as presidents have begun to lose their television audience. However, some political
observers have noted that even if a president is a strong communicator like Reagan or Clinton,
too much of a good thing is not always a smart strategy. According to Lee Cullum (Buchanan
2002, 52), a political columnist with the Dallas Morning News, “[I]t’s actually the plethora of
information that is diminishing the power of the presidency. . . . FDR did only three fireside
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chats a year . . . and yet they had enormous influence. I think today there are too many
appearances by the president on television. It’s become ho-hum. So I would say it has not
increased the power of the presidency.” So while the news media may be providing an
additional outlet for a presidential policy message stemming from the weekly radio address, there
is currently no evidence to suggest whether the result is positive or negative for the White House.

Conclusion
From the start of his administration in 2001, George W. Bush has continued the use of
weekly radio addresses as a permanent part of his communication strategy. As a rhetorical
event, the weekly radio address took on an increased importance and news value following
September 11, 2001, as Bush frequently used the weekly event to update the American public on
the status of the War on Terrorism. The White House web page also serves as a database for
Bush’s weekly radio addresses by providing a complete transcript, listed chronologically and by
topic, of each address given since January 27, 2001. However, like Reagan and Clinton, Bush
has been plagued by the difficulty of getting radio stations to broadcast the speech. According to
Taylor Gross, the current White House director of Radio, most stations choose not to carry the
broadcast. National Public Radio occasionally airs it on its “Weekend Edition” show, and hightech listeners can find the live broadcast each Saturday morning at whitehouse.gov (Atkinson
2003).
Strategically, radio addresses have become an important part of the presidential
communication arsenal. Advisors to Reagan and Clinton (and now Bush) recognized the
importance not so much in the president delivering an address that will be heard by millions of
Americans (since that does appear to occur, although exact numbers are impossible to obtain),
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but in providing a detailed policy statement that has become a routine part of weekend news
coverage. Reagan used his weekly radio address to supplement his overall public agenda with
extra discussions about economic, diplomatic, and other international issues. Clinton’s use of
radio addresses also mirrored his overall public agenda with a vast array of domestic policy
discussions. Radio addresses have become a standard and mostly regular weekend news feature
in the New York Times and the Washington Post, and the topic of the address does not seem to
dictate whether or not a story appears. Network television (ABC, CBS, and NBC) does not
provide regular coverage, simply because a radio address does not always fit with the criteria for
a good news story (action and pictures). However, the 24-hour news cycle found on the cable
networks (CNN, MSNBC, Fox) provide a better opportunity for television news to mention the
president’s weekly radio address. As such, future research on the topic of presidential weekly
radio addresses might consider who actually listens and to what effect?
Notes
1

See The Public Papers of the Presidents, Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933 (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 1976-1977).
2

The number of fireside chats given by Roosevelt is somewhat disputed; the total of 30 comes

from the FDR Presidential Library and Museum’s web page at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/firesi90.html. Only 21 of these radio addresses are listed as
“fireside chats” in the Master Speech File in FDR’s presidential papers, but the remaining nine,
eight of which were delivered between October 1942 and June 1944, were delivered over the
radio in the same format as the earlier addresses and are counted as such in most sources.
3

Several memos detailing plans for radio addresses, including suggested topics, can be found in

the White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files of H.R. Haldeman and Dwight
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Chapin, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park,
Maryland. For example, in a memo from William Safire to Chapin dated 10/6/69, Safire states:
“I’ve been pushing for a series of radio addresses for so long now, I’ve given up.” By 1971,
topics such as Vietnam, the elderly, economic growth, and government reform were suggested,
but were postponed, and were eventually covered in the campaign radio addresses paid for by the
Committee to Re-Elect the President.
4

Categories included: diplomatic and international military policy; international trade and

economic policy; domestic fiscal and monetary policy; unemployment, job creation, and
industrial policy; defense and defense conversion policy; political reform policy; anti-crime
policy; health care reform and other health policy; welfare reform and other entitlements policy;
education policy; environment, land management, and energy policy; and science, technology,
and transportation policy.
5

A full text search was done on LexisNexis for each newspaper using the terms “Reagan” or

“Clinton” along with “radio address.” Only those stories within the 24-hour news cycle
following the president’s radio address were counted. Articles not counted included those that
provided stand-alone excerpts from radio addresses with no news coverage, as well as articles
that mentioned the scheduling or location of the address but provided no news coverage of the
content of the president’s talk. Feature stories, editorials, Op-Ed columns, or those stories
appearing in the respective Metro or Business sections of each newspaper were also excluded.
6

The New York Times ran the following number of stories on Reagan’s radio addresses that

included previews of upcoming talks or references to past talks: 1982 – 9; 1983 – 8; 1984 – 8;
1985 – 17; 1986 – 9; 1987 – 18; 1988-89 – 3. The number of stories for the Washington Post
are: 1982 – 6; 1983 – 5; 1984 – 7; 1985 – 18; 1986 – 10; 1987 – 17; 1988-89 – 2.
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7

The New York Times ran the following number of stories on Clinton’s radio addresses that

included previews of upcoming talks or references to past talks: 1993 – 14; 1994 – 5; 1995 – 11
1996 – 13; 1997 – 8; 1998 – 8; 1999 – 13; 2000-01 – 5. The number of stories for the
Washington Post are: 1993 – 5; 1994 – 3; 1995 – 11; 1996 – 21; 1997 – 18; 1998 – 14; 1999 – 6;
2000-01 – 1.
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